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Legislative Approaches to Achieving More
Protection Against Risk at Less Cost
John D. Grahamt
According to the American Heritage Dictionary, "risk" is the
possibility of suffering a harm or loss.' Risk is a topic of obvious
interest to decisionmakers of all sorts, including parents, investors, insurers, patients and their physicians, state health officers,
product and process design engineers, and environmental regulators. Risk may seem to be an abstract construct, but it is a
reality of daily life for each citizen, whether the decision is about
allowing one's child to occupy the front-right seat of the car or
about whether to discourage a grandparent from driving due to
impaired vision and diminished response time. Even a growing
number of reporters and journalists, who tend to shy away from
abstract concepts to which ordinary people cannot relate, are
discovering insight through analysis of risk and communication
of comparative perspectives.2
In this Article, I summarize the case, now well documented
in the scientific literature, that the, United States suffers from a
"syndrome of paranoia and neglect" about health, safety, and
environmental risk. Stated positively, there exists tremendous
opportunity to achieve more protection of public health and the
environment at less cost than is occurring under the fragmentary
programs of risk regulation that are now in place.3 This Article
argues further that regulatory reform legislation can be designed
that will enable agencies to harness the insights of risk analysis

t Professor of Policy and Decision Sciences at the Harvard School of Public Health,
Director of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, and 1996 President of the Society for
Risk Analysis, an organization of 2,500 scientists and engineers worldwide who are
dedicated to advancing the risk sciences. The author would like to thank Nick Gertler of
Harvard Law School for helpful research assistance. Helpful comments on earlier drafts

were provided by Keith Belton, Jim Hammitt, Jill Morris, Peter Neumann, Paul Noe, and
Ricky Revesz. This paper was prepared for presentation at conferences sponsored by the
University of Chicago (November 1-2, 1996) and Duke University (November 15-16, 1996).

American Heritage Dictionaryof the English Language 1557 (Houghlin Mifflin 3d
ed 1992).
2 Are We Scaring Ourselves to Death? (ABC television broadcast, April 21, 1994).
3 Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation:Achieving
More Protectionat Less Cost, 1 Hum & Ecol Risk Assessment 183 (1995).
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without imposing unrealistic technical burdens on resourcestrapped agencies.' A menu of specific reform ideas is presented
for consideration by legislators. The Article concludes with a brief
discussion of the political feasibility of various kinds of reform
legislation.
The Article's most ambitious recommendation is that the
United States Congress should pass a comprehensive risk-regulation statute that directs the Executive Office of the President to
establish an explicit, rigorous process of priority-setting, both
among and within the various risk-protection agencies.' At the
present time, there is no uniform statute governing the prioritysetting activities of such agencies. Existing risk-regulation laws
were adopted starting in the late 1960s and have been amended
intermittently in the intervening years,6 but Congress has never
examined them in a holistic fashion. Nor is there any legislative
authorization for a powerful coordinating entity within the
Executive Office of the President. The Article's major reform
recommendation is not exactly original; it is "pirated" from a
recent report of the Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform,7 which adapted a related idea advanced originally by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer in his Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures of 1992.'

I. DIMENSIONS OF RISK
Risk is ubiquitous and is thus a part of everyone's daily life.
Whether choosing mutual funds, buying a new car, responding to
a marriage proposal, ordering dinner from a menu, or just deciding whether to cross the street, the subject of risk is often an
important facet of decisionmaking. Social decisions are also
plagued with risks. Should policy-makers choose nuclear power,
fossil fuels, or solar energy as our nation's major source of electricity? Should regulators require automobile airbags that are
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
Stan L Rev 247 (1996).
' See Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decisionmaking 71-95 (1993).
6 Examples include Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994) (enacted as a comprehensive federal measure in 1970, and amended substantially in 1977 and 1990); Clean
Water Act, 33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994) (enacted as a comprehensive federal measure in
1972, and amended substantially in 1977 and 1987).
Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, 1 Hum & Ecol Risk Assessment at
183 (cited in note 3).
' Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 5961 (Harvard 1993).
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aggressive enough to protect large, unbelted adult males in highspeed frontal crashes, or should regulators require less powerful
bags that are "kinder" to out-of-position children and short drivers?
The subject of risk is fascinating in part because risks are
not homogenous. They differ in the nature of the harm or loss,
whether it be financial, health-related, or ecological. They also
differ in probability of occurrence: the average American faces
one chance in four of dying from cancer in his or her lifetime,9
one chance in 100 of dying in a traffic crash," four chances in a
million of being struck and killed on the ground by a crashing
airplane," and no more than one chance in a million of developing cancer from selected pesticide residues on foods under the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") negligible-risk
standard.12
Public health professionals are concerned not only about the
probability of harm to an individual but also about the number of
people at risk." There are, for example, roughly 25,000 Americans who inhale the maximum air concentrations of fumes near
the fence lines of the nation's 36 coke production plants, 14 but
all 250 million Americans inhale the fumes emitted from the tailpipes of the 180 million motor vehicles used on roads and highways. When assessing catastrophic events that could harm numerous people, the size of the population at risk is a critical
consideration. In comparing sites for construction of a nuclear
power plant (or waste-disposal facility), the very small probability
of large releases of ionizing radiation needs to be considered in
conjunction with the number of people (now and in the future)
who may live within the vicinity of the site.
Risks also vary in how their losses are distributed. If the loss
concerns financial well-being, decisionmakers may want to know

' John D. Graham, Laura Green, and M.J. Roberts, In Search of Safety: Chemicals
and Cancer Risk (Harvard 1988).
10 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Health USA (1992).
" Bernard D. Goldstein, et al, Risk to Groundlings of Death Due to Airplane Accidents: A Risk CommunicationPerspective, 12 Risk Analysis 339 (1992).
12 Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray, and John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 Ecol L Q 269 (1992); Betsy Carpenter,
Serving Up a Safer Food Supply, US News & World Report 61 (Aug 5, 1996).
3 Bernard Goldstein, The Maximally Exposed Individual: An Appropriate Guide for
Public Health Decisionmaking, Envir F 13 (Nov-Dec 1990); Curtis C. Travis, Cancer Risk
Management,.21 Envir Sci & Tech 415 (1987).
14 John D. Graham and David R. Holtgrave, Coke Oven Emissions: A Case Study
of
Technology-based Regulation, 1 Risk: Issues in Health & Safety 243 (1990).
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who experiences the loss (for example, whether the losers were
poor or wealthy prior to the loss). If the harm is to wildlife,
decisionmakers may want to know whether the species is endangered on a global scale or whether the species is endangered in a
particular ecosystem. For harms to human health,
decisionmakers may inquire about whether particularly vulnerable populations (for example, children and the elderly) are exposed to danger.
And it is increasingly apparent that these types of losses are
interrelated, since poor people are generally subject to more
health risks than the wealthy, and poor societies tend to be less
interested in making public health and environmental investments than are well-to-do societies. 5
From a scientific perspective, risks differ in how they were
discovered, how well they have been characterized, and how well
their causation is known."6 The traumatic risks of traffic crashes
are well understood from an actuarial perspective on the basis of
extensive historical data from the United States and other regions of the world. The risks of contracting cancer from exposure
to low levels of chemicals in air and water are not well understood because they typically cannot be detected with epidemiological methods and thus are usually predicted based on data from
animal tests and mathematical models that cannot be validated
with direct observation of disease. The risks that the same chemicals pose to workers are better understood because levels of
exposure in the workplace tend to be much higher and thus the
resulting diseases are sometimes detectable with epidemiological
methods. 7 Scientific knowledge permits some risks to be quantified with specified levels of precision, but in the case of poorly
understood risks, such as the dangers of global warming from
carbon dioxide pollution, it may not be feasible to do anything
but describe various hazard scenarios. In some cases, it may also
be possible to assign these scenarios a subjective probability of
occurrence based on the opinions of qualified experts."i Some

" Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditure, 10 Risk
Analysis 147, 156-57 (1990); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer, 60 Pub Interest 23 (1980).
S

Edmund A.C. Crouch and Richard Wilson, Risk-Benefit Analysis 9-21 (Ballinger

1982).

C. Mark Smith, David C. Christiani, and Karl T. Kelsey, ChemicalRisk Assessment
and Occupational Health:Current Application,Limitations, and FutureProspects (Auburn
17

House 1994).
" Roger M. Cooke, Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in
Science (Oxford 1991).
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alleged risks are so poorly understood (for example, reproductive
abnormalities from estrogenic chemical exposure) or are so un..
likely to be real (for example, the possible links of childhood
cancers with exposure to electric and magnetic fields from power
lines) that quantitative risk assessment is not (currently) feasible, meaningful, or worthwhile.
Risks differ in the severity of the harm or loss at stake. If
the outcome is adverse to human health, the clinical diagnosis
may be acute trauma, an infectious disease, or some form of
chronic disease. Risk assessors are increasingly interested in not;
only cancer risks but also harm that arises from damage to the
developmental and reproductive processes, the immune system,
and the endocrine system. Clinical prognoses for patients vary
enormously from temporary, mild pain with complete recovery to
imminent death. Although some conditions are fatal, many others
are nonfatal but still entail a period of impairment, in some cases
a lifelong and progressively worsening state of impairment (for
example, arthritis).
Risks have various causes, some that are simple and others
more complex. Risks have been attributed to natural events (for
example, earthquakes and naturally occurring radon gas), to
specific technologies (for example, nuclear power generation and
the automobile), to specific lifestyle choices (for example, smoking
and lack of physical exercise), and to combinations of nature,
man, and technology. What precisely causes various harms is
often unknown or poorly understood, but logical prevention steps
may still be identified. For example, the lack of understanding of'
the precise biological mechanisms that govern the leukemogenesis resulting from high levels of benzene exposure did not stop
the prohibition of benzene use by Turkish shoemakers and the
resulting decline of leukemia among these shoemakers. 9
Risks also differ in the amount of time that elapses between
the causative event and the adverse outcome. The adverse events
from violence occur immediately. In the absence of childhood
vaccinations, communicable disease may occur within one to five
years. Cancers from chemical exposures may take 15 to 40 years
to develop. And the consequences of global warming from the
greenhouse effect could take 100 years to materialize. Some people believe greater priority should be given to immediate risks,
yet there is also concern that we not neglect the welfare of our
children's children.
" Graham, Green, and Roberts, In Search of Safety (cited in note 9).
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Laypeople perceive risks somewhat differently than statisticians do. People tend to focus less on the numerical aspects of
risk, which are difficult to fathom, and focus more on qualitative
aspects of risk that have intuitive, emotional, and ethical significance.20 Is the risk imposed on people without their knowledge or consent? Is the risk dreadful (mysterious, fatal, uncontrollable)? Is the risk potentially catastrophic? Is the risk "fair"
(for example, do the people who incur the risk also reap the benefit of the activity or technology)? Does the risk have "signal value" (indicating the reality of an adverse consequence that previously had been unforeseen or considered impossible to occur) and
"ripple" potential (such as the far-reaching implications of nuclear accident at Three Mile Island).2 1 The field of risk-perception
research has exploded in the last twenty years as it has become
apparent that "perceived risk" is a multidimensional phenomenon
that decisionmakers need to understand if they are to predict
public reactions to risk.2 2 Some (though not this author) would
go so far as to suggest that there are no "real risks" but only
different perceptions of risk based on a person's values,
worldview, experience, and technical understanding.'

II. REGULATING RISKS
One of American society's central responses to such
risks-though by no means the only response-is a process of
"risk regulation," by which government agencies evaluate risk
claims, establish priorities (at least implicitly), and decide what
should be done to reduce or eliminate potential risks that are
judged worthy of governmental priority. A special focus of this
article is the federal government's process of regulating risks to
public health, safety, and the environment that arise from commercial activities such as the producing, transporting, selling,
consuming, or disposing of a product. Not addressed here are
non-regulatory approaches to risk management such as the tort
liability system as it is applied to injuries resulting from products
and technologies.

o Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987).
Roger E. Kasperson, et al, The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 Risk Analysis 177 (1988).
' Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Rating the Risks, 21 Envir 3
(1979).
' Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Corello, eds, The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Solution and Perception (Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland
1987).
21
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Congress has passed numerous statutes that authorize pro.tective actions by risk regulators.2' Congress will sometimes
make a highly detailed and prescriptive response to a specific
risk claim. One example is the requirements forcing major indus..
tries to install the maximum achievable control technology to
reduce emissions of 189 toxic air pollutants under the Clean Air
Act.25 More often, however, Congress will delegate broad discretionary authority to an administrative agency, with only limited.
guidance about what the agency should do. The delegation of
authority to ban or restrict products or chemicals that pose "unreasonable risks" to human health or the environment under the
Consumer Product Safety Act 2" and the Toxic Substances Control Act 27 are examples of this practice. Risk statutes are often
written on the heels of tragic or outrageous incidents with high public salience' and therefore do not usually set in motion rigorous,
analytical approaches to managing risks."
There are at least twelve federal regulatory agencies with
statutory responsibility for regulating risks that arise from business-related activities. 0 The largest agency, measured by annual budget and number of employees, is the EPA. Interestingly,
the annual budget of the EPA (about $7 billion in fiscal year
1996) is about as large as the sum of the budgets of the other
eleven agencies combined, and EPA's budget has experienced a
larger rate of growth than any of the other agencies since the
early 1980s. Some of the other key "risk-protection" agencies are
the Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the Food Safety and Quality Service, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, and
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The Department of Defense might also be considered a risk-protection agency-it is certainly responsible for many risk-management deciSee Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray, and John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 Ecol L Q 269 (1992).
25 42 USC § 7412(b), (d) (1994).
15 USC § 2057 (1994).
15 USC § 2606(a), (f) (1994).
Roger Noll and James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 29 J Legal Stud 747 (1990).
' Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation:Achieving
More Protectionat Less Cost, 1 Hum & Ecol Risk Assessment 183 (1995).
o Melinda Warren, Reforming the Regulatory Process: Rhetoric or Reality?
(Occassional Paper, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University
1994).
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sions-but in this Article I confine my attention to agencies that
regulate commercial activities with consequences for human
health, safety, and the environment.
The budgets of federal risk-protection agencies are tiny compared with the compliance costs that these agencies impose on
the operation of government and the private sector. Total regulatory compliance costs in the United States are now estimated to
be in the vicinity of $670 billion per year, with a majority of
these costs attributable to risk-protection regulations." About a
third of these compliance costs are incurred by federal and state
government (for example, the waste cleanup requirements imposed on the Departments of Defense and Energy) while the
remaining two-thirds are incurred by businesses and other private sector organizations. 2 Compliance costs are often well justified by risk-reduction benefits, but in some cases the estimated
benefits from risk reduction are relatively small, or no benefit
estimates have been generated by agencies and reported to
decisionmakers." Estimates of compliance costs are notoriously
fallible, though in recent years analysts have applied more
thought and rigor to computing the costs of regulations and new
technologies.'

III. DEFINING THE "RISK SCIENCES"
This Article uses the phrase "risk sciences" broadly, to encompass the tools of hazard identification, exposure assessment,
dose-response assessment, risk characterization, comparative risk
assessment, probabilistic risk assessment, scenario analysis,
fault-tree analysis, uncertainty analysis, risk evaluation, risk
perception, risk communication, utility assessment, decision analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and valueof-information analysis. In the relevant professional community,
these tools are sometimes referred to loosely with the phrase
"risk analysis," as in the Society for Risk Analysis and the publi-

Thomas D. Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J Reg & Soc Costs 5 (1994).
Thomas D. Hopkins, Regulatory Costs in Profile (Policy Study, Center for the Study
of American Business, Washington University 1996).
Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?,
in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation (Oxford 1996); Robert W. Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 Yale J Reg 233 (1991).
' United States Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Investment: The
Cost of a Clean Environment (1990); Martha R. Gold, et al, Cost-Effectiveness in Health
and Medicine (Oxford 1996).
31
32

LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

cation Risk Analysis: An InternationalJournal.However, because
risk analysis probably has a more narrow meaning to many
laypeople, lawyers, and scientists, this Article uses the term "risk
sciences" instead. Since risk regulation entails understanding
human behavior and making value judgments as well as using
objective data from the physical sciences and engineering, the
social and decision
sciences make important contributions to the
35
"risk sciences."

In placing such strong faith in the risk sciences, a relatively
young field of scholarly inquiry, I am not assuming that sufficiently precise knowledge and tools are available to treat regulatory priority setting as a straightforward problem of mathematical optimization. Priority-setting decisions about uncertain risks
must, in the final analysis, rest with human beings who are
accountable to the public for their use of uncertain science and
for their approach to making difficult value judgments under
conditions of uncertainty.
The risk sciences, immature as they may be, are an attractive guide for priority setting precisely because they were designed to solve problems where traditional indicators of scientific
uncertainty are large and where value tradeoffs must be made
involving different people and outcomes.38 Without the aid of
such tools, laypeople and experts make more errors-and more
serious errors-in judgment than they might have made if they
had been assisted by insights from the risk sciences.37 Of course,
the mistakes made by risk scientists cannot be eliminated, but
they can be minimized through processes of peer review and
public scrutiny. 8
' National Research Council, UnderstandingRisk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (National Academy 1996).
' Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty (Addison-Wesley 1968); Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple
Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (John Wiley and Sons 1976); Charles A.
Holloway, Decision Making under Uncertainty: Models and Choices (Prentice-Hall 1979);
John W. Pratt, Howard Raiffa, and Robert Schlaifer, Statistical Decision Theory (MIT
1995).
" David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive,
Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions (Cambridge 1988); Roger M. Cooke, Experts in
Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science (Oxford 1991); Baruch
Fischhoff, Value Elicitation: Is There Anything There?, 46 Am Psychologist 835 (1991);
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge 1982); Richard J. Zeckhauser and W. Kip Viscusi, Risk
Within Reason, 238 Science 559 (1990).
' John D. Graham, Resolving the Regulatory Science Dilemma, in John D. Graham,
ed, Harnessing Science for Environmental Regulation 211, 213 (Praeger 1990); Sheila
Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Harvard 1990).
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For operational purposes, I define "rational" priority setting
as a process of selecting potential hazards for regulatory attention based on the insights and, where possible, prescriptions
derived from the risk sciences. At first glance, this definition of
"rationality" may appear to be somewhat technocratic (and it is
to some extent). Upon closer examination, however, the diligent
reader will discern that the value judgments expressed by representative lay citizens-after participation in various structured
mechanisms designed to produce deliberation and thoughtful
reflection 3 9-play a central role in the risk sciences. Yet I am
suggesting a notion of "rationality" in priority setting that is
different from what might be produced through alternative processes that have been proposed such as stakeholder mediation
(for example, negotiation between representatives of businesses
and environmental groups), popular will (for example, as expressed by opinion polls or ballot propositions), and/or scientific
consensus workshops (for example, the opinions offered by panels
of the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences).
This Article's case for risk-based reforms is made primarily
with examples from public health and safety regulation (whether
pollution-related or otherwise), but I recognize that ecological
risks are also an important concern to risk regulators and the
public. 0 I shall leave it to my colleagues in ecological risk assessment to make the case-with which I also agree-that the
risk sciences have much to offer in setting priorities for protecting wildlife and ecosystems.41
IV. EVIDENCE OF MISPLACED PRIORITIES
The public's general reaction to health, safety, and environmental risks might best be described as a syndrome of paranoia
and neglect.42 We are paranoid in the sense that we devote large
amounts of resources and attention to speculative and minute

' National Research Council, UnderstandingRisk (cited in note 35); Fischhoff, 46 Am
Psychologist at 835 (cited in note 37); Baruch Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 Health, Safety,
& Envir 191 (1995).
0 National Research Council, Issues in Risk Assessment (National Academy 1992).
Lawrence W. Barnthouse, Issues in Ecological Risk Assessment: The CRAM Perspective, 14 Risk Analysis 251 (1994); Mark A. Harwell, William Cooper, and Robert
Flaak, PrioritizingEcological and Human Welfare Risks from Environmental Stresses, 16
Envir Mgmt 451 (1992).
2 John D. Graham, The New Congress: A Strong Finish on Regulatory Reform, Risk
Pol Rep 31 (Aug 23, 1996).

LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

risks. But we are also neglectful in the sense that we do not give
much attention or priority to a variety of well-documented and.
substantial risks to public health, safety, and the environment.'
One of the most widespread tendencies is to underestimate the
role of lifestyle choices in determining health status while overestimating the role of environmental factors such as pollution."
Rather than review an extensive and complex literature that is
published elsewhere, I shall offer three illustrations of the syndrome and then summarize a relevant doctoral dissertation completed at the Harvard School of Public Health in 1994.
First, in 1990 the United States Congress passed, at the
urging of President George Bush, roughly 1,000 pages of amendments to the Clean Air Act4 that are estimated to cost this nation an additional $30 billion per year.4 Some provisions of this
law have attractive benefit-cost ratios while others are difficult to
defend, even accepting the fact that costs may be overestimated
and benefits difficult to quantify. The aim of the 1990 Amendments was further reduction of outdoor air pollution, the same
aim Congress had when it passed the first federally administered
Clean Air Act in 19704' and amended it in 1977.4 While Congress was surely correct to have addressed residual' Ilevels of
outdoor air pollution, it virtually ignored indoor air pollution.
Risk scientists have observed that indoor air pollution is a
more serious public health risk than outdoor air pollution because the concentrations of many pollutants tend to be higher
indoors than outdoors and because most people spend more time
indoors than outdoors.49 Although most indicators of outdoor air
pollution have improved (often dramatically) since 1970, there is
' Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U
Chi L Rev 1 (1995).
" Graham, Risk Pol Rep at 31 (cited in note 42); Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention, Harvard Report on Cancer Prevention, 7 Cancer Causes & Control 3 (1996); J.
Michael McGinnis and William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 270
JAMA 2207 (1993); Courtney LaFountain, Public Health and the Environment: Do People
Matter? (Working Paper 163, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington
University 1996).
," Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, codified at
42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
Paul R. Portney, Economics and the Clean Air Act, 4 J Econ Persp 173 (1990).

' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
"' Jonathan M. Samet and John D. Spengler, IndoorAir Pollution:A Health Perspective (Johns Hopkins 1991); Kirk Smith, Taking the True Measure of Air Pollution, EPA J 6

(Oct-Dec 1993).
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no evidence that indoor air quality has improved during this
same time period, and it may have deteriorated (due to the diminished ventilation of homes and buildings caused by energy
conservation measures begun in the 1970s). Yet there is no powerful public demand or sustained advocacy effort for legislation
aimed at enhancing indoor air quality in the United States."
Rationalizations for this peculiar sense of priorities can be
made. The sources of outdoor air pollution are significant contributors to indoor air pollution, but indoor sources are also quite
important. Politicians, while willing to regulate businesses that
pollute outdoor air, may be reluctant to intrude into people's
homes and office buildings. Yet the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, if implemented as intended, are likely to be quite intrusive
in a variety of ways, such as mandatory emissions testing of
vehicles 5 ' and mandatory use of reformulated fuels with offensive odors5 2 and higher prices at the pump. The ecological concerns associated with outdoor air pollution may not apply to
indoor air pollution, but it should not be forgotten that some of
the expensive provisions of the 1990 Amendments-those dealing
with ozone and toxics control-were triggered primarily by concern for public health rather than ecology.53
Rationalizations aside, a straightforward explanation of this
perverse situation is that the public and their elected officials,
ignorant of the comparative risk information, are perhaps overreacting to the risks of outdoor air pollution and underreacting to
the risks of indoor air pollution. For example, if a proposal could
be made to transfer $5 billion of the $30 billion in annual expenditure from outdoor to indoor air quality, and if citizens were
informed that the reallocation would accomplish a significant net
improvement in public health, it is my suspicion that most
thoughtful citizens would support this proposal (assuming there
were insufficient resources to do both).
A second illustration of distorted priorities can be found in
the field of cancer risk prevention, where expenditures on "secondary prevention" (for example, early detection and treatment of
developing tumors) are held to a much stricter investment standard than are expenditures aimed at "primary prevention" (for

'o National Research Council, Human Exposure to Airborne Pollutants (National

Academy 1991); Frank Cross, Legal Responses to Indoor Air Pollution (Quorum 1990).
5' 42 USC § 7525 (1994).
52

42 USC § 7545(k) (1994).
Portney, 4 J Econ Persp at 173 (cited in note 46).
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example, reducing human exposures to carcinogens in air and
water). In the unsuccessful national health plan designed by
Hillary Rodham Clinton's task force, coverage of screening for
cervical cancer and breast cancer was authorized, but only once
every three years and two years, respectively. 4 Risk analysts
gauge the cost-effectiveness of such measures by computing the
net costs of screening and early treatment (taking into account
any savings in later treatment), and dividing them by the number of years of life saved among women due to prevention of'
tumor progression. The Clinton Administration's rejection of
more frequent screening intervals reflects a value judgment that
the cost-effectiveness ratios of shorter screening intervals, those
exceeding $100,000 per year of life saved, would have been excessive (because the number of additional tumors detected and
treated deteriorates rapidly with more frequent intervals). Interestingly, when adopting carcinogen regulations, EPA routinely
makes investments in cancer prevention that have implicit costeffectiveness ratios that are much larger than what the Clinton
Administration rejected in the proposed national health plan. For
example, in a survey of EPA regulations aimed at curbing air
emissions of benzene, a chemical known to cause leukemia in
workers at high doses, the estimated cost per year of life saved
ranged from $200,000 to $50,000,000."5
Again, one can advance arguments that might favor higher
investment ratios for cancer prevention through pollution control.
Cancer from pollution may be ethically more suspect than cancer
from unknown causes, though it is quite possible that some of the
tumors stopped by screening and treatment are also related to
environmental exposures (broadly defined). Some citizens may
develop a sense of satisfaction about socking "corporate polluters," but it should not be forgotten that consumers and workers
(as well as stockholders) ultimately bear these costs. The pollutants may have other (non-cancer) health effects or ecological
impacts that justify a larger investment, though this is very
unlikely to be the case for the benzene example cited above. It
certainly makes more sense to prevent a tumor from developing
than it does to treat it after it emerges, yet patient utility assess-

" Health Security Act, HR 3600, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 41 (Nov 20, 1993), reprinted in
Commerce Clearing House, President Clinton's Health CareReform Proposal and Health
Security Act (CCH 1993).
John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Robert W.
Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation 183
(Oxford 1996).
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ments-where the utility of a year of perfect health is compared
to the utility of a year with a diagnosed tumor 5 6-suggest that
this consideration is not likely to justify an investment premium
in the range of two to fifty for pollution control.
When these kinds of ratios are compared, the scientific uncertainties need to be considered. 7 While the cost-effectiveness
ratios are uncertain, the true difference is likely to be much larger than two to fifty because the ratio for cancer screening is a
"best estimate," while the estimates for pollution prevention are
not best estimates. In fact, the cost-effectiveness ratios for benzene control are based on a crucial yet questionable assumption:
that any exposure to benzene, no matter how small, is associated
with an incremental increase in leukemia risk. This assumption
may well be incorrect. If there is a strict threshold in the doseresponse function for benzene and leukemia (a dose below which
the risk of leukemia does not increase), and if ambient benzene
exposure levels in the United States are already below this
threshold dose, then the true cost-effectiveness ratios for EPA's
benzene rules are infinity.
This is another case where rationalizations may sidestep a
more straightforward explanation: the relevant decisionmakers
and the public may be unaware of the existence of this discrepancy in resource allocation and, if informed, would be startled by
the magnitude of the discrepancy. No authority in the federal
government currently possesses the responsibility and synoptic
perspective to identify such discrepancies. It may be difficult to
imagine how resources could be directly transferred from pollution prevention to cancer screening, but the point here is simply
that cancer prevention priorities are misordered. As we shall see,
there are many creative ways to reallocate resources, once citizens and their elected officials recognize that priorities need to be
reordered.
A third illustration of misordered priorities concerns the
allocation of resources to the prevention of lead poisoning among
children.5 8 There is a large and growing body of evidence that
" Bruce E. Hillner and Thomas J. Smith, Efficacy and Cost Effectiveness of Adjuvant
Chemotherapy in Women with Node-Negative Breast Cancer: A Decision-Analysis Model,
324 New Eng J Med 160 (1991).
"7 See Adam M. Finkel, Toward Less Misleading Comparisons of Uncertain Risks:
The Example of Aflatoxin and Alar, 103 Envir Health Persp 376 (1995); John Mullahy and
Willard Manning, Statistical Issues in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in Frank A. Sloan, ed,
Valuing Health Care: Costs, Benefits, and Effectiveness of Pharmaceutical,and Other
Medical Technologies 149 (Cambridge 1995).
" See Karen L. Florini and Ellen K. Silbergeld, Getting the Lead Out, 9 Issues in Sci
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exposure to relatively small amounts of lead at a young age can
diminish the intelligence of children and retard their progress in
school. Although lead has been banned from gasoline, other
sources of lead remain and are not being addressed in a rational
manner. For example, a large federal program, Superfund, exists
to clean up the lead and other contaminants left in the soil at
abandoned hazardous waste sites.5 9 The average remedial expenditure at a Superfund site is in the range of $30 million, and
lead is often cited as a key contaminant that drives up cleanup
expenditures at such sites. The rationale for cleanup is that the
contaminated soil at these abandoned sites, while not necessarily
posing a risk to children today, might pose a risk to children in
the future if residential neighborhoods were to be developed on or
near the abandoned site and if children were to come into contact
with the lead.
This type of investment may exhibit prudence, but it also can
be considered extravagant. It is distressing that such substantial
remedial expenditures are made, often at remote locations where
residential development is unlikely, at the same time that no
large-scale federal program exists to protect the millions of children living in older homes who are exposed now, each day of
their lives, to lead in the form of house dust on window seals and
floors." A larger, more widespread, and more urgent source of
lead exposure is being neglected while regulators spend millions
of dollars washing soil at abandoned industrial sites. The total
number of IQ points protected from lead exposure would surely
be greater if remedial expenditures were transferred from the
Superfund program to poor families in older homes for use in
lead prevention activities," especially considering the fact that
500 to 1,000 homes can be abated for every one lead-contaminated Superfund site that is subjected to a rigorous soil-washing
program. 2 I shall leave it to the reader to judge whether this
discrepancy in priorities can somehow be justified.

& Tech 33 (1993).
" Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC
§ 9601 et seq (1994).
' Bruce P. Lanphear, et al, Lead-Contaminated House Dust and Urban Children's
Blood Level, 86 Am J Pub Health 1416 (1996).
61 Id.
62 Joshua Cohen, An Analytic Evaluation of Strategies to Address Domestic Childhood
Lead Exposure in American Cities (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University
1994) (on file with author).
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The evidence regarding misordered priorities extends well
beyond these three illustrations. There is the mystery about why
carcinogenic chemicals are regulated more stringently than carcinogenic radiation, even though the ultimate outcome, cancer, is
the same for both exposures.' Until very recently, radon in
drinking water has been of greater concern to Congress and the
EPA than radon in air, a case of backwards priority if one examines estimates of relative risk and cost-effectiveness. The minute
quantities of pesticide residues on fruits and vegetables are widely perceived to be a more certain cancer hazard than is the low
rate of fruit and vegetable consumption in the United States,
even though risk science suggests precisely the reverse.' And
the outdoor air pollutants with non-cancer health effects that are
regulated under Section 109 of the Clean Air Acte (so-called
"criteria air pollutants") often have safety factors of two or less
(comparing permissible to current levels of human exposure)
while outdoor air pollutants addressed under Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act' (so-called "hazardous air pollutants") often have
safety factors of 100 to 1,000 or even more. 7
The cumulative impact of this syndrome of paranoia and
neglect is not trivial. The extent of what I call (with provocative
intent) "statistical murder" from misordered priorities has never
been fully calculated, but Tammy Tengs has performed an intriguing calculation based on information concerning just 200
programs in the United States." She estimates that a reallocation of resources from cost-ineffective to cost-effective programs
would save an additional 60,000 lives (and 600,000 years of additional life) annually in the United States, at no increased cost to
the public or private sectors. 69 Alternatively, she estimated that
the United States could save the same number of lives that we
are currently saving but at an annual cost saving of $31 billion
See Stephen L. Brown, Harmonizing Chemical and Radiation Risk Management,
26 Envir Sci & Tech 2336 (1992).
" See National Research Council, Carcinogens and Anti-Carcinogensin the Human
Diet (National Academy 1996).
42 USC § 7409 (1994).
42 USC § 7412 (1994).
" Commission on Risk Assessment and Management, (draft report, 1996) (on file
with author).
6
See Tammy 0. Tengs, et al, Five Hundred Lifesaving Programsand Their CostEffectiveness, 15 Risk Analysis 369 (1995); Tammy 0. Tengs and John D. Graham, The
Opportunity Costs of HaphazardSocial Investments in Lifesaving, in Robert W. Hahn, ed,
Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation 167 (Oxford 1996).
"' Tengs and Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in
Lifesaving at 172 (cited in note 68).
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per year.7" Based on this limited sample, it is clear that the in..
sights from the risk sciences, if implemented carefully, can pro.duce more protection at less cost than is now being delivered. Dr.
Tengs's path-breaking results have recently been reaffirmed in a
much larger study of regulatory programs prepared by Dr. Robert
Hahn of the American Enterprise Institute.7
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE RISK SCIENCES

Before addressing how society might do a better job of establishing rational priorities based on the risk sciences, it is useful
to consider a variety of objections to the risk sciences. Some of
these objections have more merit than others and thus some
direct discussion of them is appropriate.
Objection 1: The risk sciences cannot produce rational
priority setting because there is too much scientific disagreement (or at least uncertainty) about whether various risks exist, their magnitude (if they exist), and their
ultimate consequences for human health and the environment.
The extent of scientific knowledge about the existence and
magnitude of various hazards does vary enormously. When scientific knowledge of hazards is limited, disagreements among scientists often develop about what is most likely to be true, what is
the worst outcome that could occur, and what should be done in
the absence of perfect knowledge.72 Fortunately, the risk sciences offer some very well-designed tools for assisting
decisionmakers
faced with limitations in scientific understand73
ing.

As a starting point, the risk sciences recommend that
decisionmakers be informed about the nature and magnitude of
the uncertainties about hazards, not only through qualitative
discussion of the unknowns but also through formal quantitative
uncertainty analysis. 74 For example, the risk assessor might reId at 173.
See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell
Us?, in Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved 208 (cited in note 68).
72 John D. Graham, Laura Green, and M.J. Roberts, In Search of Safety: Chemicals
and CancerRisk (Harvard 1988).
73 See Howard Raiffa, DecisionAnalysis: IntroductoryLectures on Choices under
Uncertainty (Addison-Wesley 1968); Charles A. Holloway, Decision Making under Uncertainty:
Models and Choices (Prentice-Hall. 1979).
" National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (National
70
71
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port that, given current exposures to a particular chemical in the
United States, there is a 1 percent chance that 1,000 additional
people will ultimately die due to cancer each year, a 4 percent
chance that 100 people will die, a 35 percent chance that 10
people will die, and a 60 percent chance that no one will die. In
current regulatory practice, this type of analysis is rarely done
with much rigor, and agencies may actually have legal incentives
under current law to downplay technical uncertainties in their
estimates of risk.75 Yet technical progress in this field is advancing rapidly, 78 as are the computer software tools necessary to
undertake formal uncertainty analysis.77

In some cases, the degree of scientific uncertainty can be
characterized using classical statistical methods (for example,
based on the available data from epidemiological studies and
current population exposure distributions, the 95 percent confidence level on the excess number of cancer cases per year due to
hazard X is 500 to 2,500). When, however, there are no human
data whatsoever, or when an extrapolation of tumor response
must be made from high doses to low doses, uncertainties multiply. If there are fundamental mechanistic uncertainties about
whether and how an adverse health event occurs (so-called "model uncertainty"), then the risk sciences may suggest a more
subjectivist approach to uncertainty analysis that has been developed by Bayesian statisticians and decision analysts. The
subjectivist approaches permit uncertainty to be quantified in
probabilistic form (using a "strength of belief' concept of probability) based on the opinions of qualified scientists.78

Experts are certainly fallible, and there are well-documented
instances where experts have overstated their knowledge

Academy 1995).
7' John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Robert W.
Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation (Oxford

1996).
"6 See National Council on Radiation Protection, A Guide for UncertaintyAnalysis in
Dose and Risk Assessments Related to Environmental Contamination (National Council on

Radiation Protection Commentary, 1996) ("Guide for UncertaintyAnalysis).
" Granger M. Morgan and Max Henrion, Uncertainty: A Guide to Dealing with
Uncertainty in Quantitative Risk and Policy Analysis (Cambridge 1991); P.D. Moskowitz,

et al, An Evaluation of Three RepresentativeMultimedia Models Used to Support Cleanup
Decisionmaking at Hazardous,Mixed, and Radioactive Waste Sites, 16 Risk Analysis 279
(1996).
78 Roger M. Cooke, Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in
Science (Oxford 1991); National Council on Radiation Protection, Guide for Uncertainty
Analysis (cited in note 76).
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base-both inadvertently and intentionally. 9 Consulting diverse
groups of experts is a way to begin addressing this problem.
Procedures are available to convey the opinions of groups of qualified experts as well as the range of individual expert opinion
within a group of experts. In order to determine how much faith
to place in expert opinions, some of these-opinions can be tested
for both their degree of "calibration" and for their degree of "resolution"--technical indicators of how useful an expert's opinions
are to a decisionmaker. Methods of formal uncertainty analysis
have already been applied to a variety of problems in medicine,
public health, engineering, and environmental health, and they
are currently underutilized by federal risk-protection agencies."
Once uncertainties have been analyzed for a group of hazards, the question remains how to rank them for priority-setting
purposes in light of the uncertainties. For example, the 'most
likely" (modal) estimate of risk for hazard A may exceed the
"most likely" estimate of risk for hazard B. Yet the "worst-case"
estimate of risk for hazard B may exceed the "worst-case" estimate of risk for hazard A. Risk scientists and decision analysts
recognize that this ranking problem cannot be resolved without
introducing some explicit value judgments about how to set priorities in the face of uncertainty.8
In situations where numerous priority-setting decisions will
be made over time and where the social objective is to maximize
the amount of public health and environmental protection
achieved in the long run, a strong technical case has been made
in favor of ranking risks according to the "best estimate" of risk,
where the best estimate is the mean of the probability distribution over possible outcomes. 2 A parallel case has been made for
using best estimates of uncertain financial returns when making
investments aimed at maximizing long-term monetary value, at
least in the case of large companies or government agencies that
can cope with the severe downside possibilities.' If, however,

SK.S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (California 1991).
National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (cited in note

'o

74).

8, John D. Graham and Lorenz Rhomberg, How Risks are Identified and Assessed,
545 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 15 (1996).
82 Charles A. Holloway, Decision Making under Uncertainty: Models and Choices
(Prentice-Hall 1979). For the skewed distributions that are commonplace in risk assessments, the mean differs from both the mode and median of the distribution and may be
influenced strongly by the right-hand tail of the distribution of risk estimates.
' Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluationof Public Investment Decisions, 60 Am Econ Rev 364 (1970).

32

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1997:

some of the environmental hazards to be ranked pose catastrophic possibilities (for example, a huge nuclear power accident or
massive species destruction due to global climate change), rational decisionmakers may wish to introduce a degree of "risk
aversion" into their priority setting that, in effect, gives somewhat higher priority to preventing low-probability, high-consequence threats. In financial terms, large businesses (with diversified portfolios) can afford to display less risk aversion than small
businesses or individuals who must guard against crippling
downside losses. From a technical point of view, such risk aversion can be introduced into priority setting by ranking hazards
according to their "certainty equivalent" rather than according to
their "best estimate," a procedure designed specifically to account
for risk aversion." One might be tempted to believe that because citizens exhibit risk aversion toward money in their personal lives (a perfectly rational response to a poor asset position),
a democratic government should reflect these values and exhibit
risk aversion in collective decisionmaking. This line of reasoning
is mistaken because governments, due to their greater assets and
diversified investment portfolio, are capable of making risk management decisions that individuals are incapable of making. For
the vast majority of collective decisions involving non-catastrophic outcomes, a good technical case has been made that thoughtful
citizens, behind a "veil of ignorance" that promotes civic-minded
decisionmaking, would behave in a "risk-neutral" fashion (that is,
rank uncertain risks according to their mean ("best") estimates).
Likewise, the responsible government regulator who seeks to
save the most lives (or wildlife) in the long run should be very
reluctant to chart priorities on the basis of risk estimates other
than the best estimate. Fortunately, Congress has recently recognized that agencies do not always report best estimates of risk.
As a result, it is beginning to compel reporting of such information on a routine basis, such as the recent risk assessment language included in the amendments to the Safe Drinking Water
Act."

Id.
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub L No 104-182, 110 Stat 1613,
1621-23, codified at 42 USC § 300g-1(bX1) (1994 & Supp 1996).
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Objection 2: The risk sciences cannot produce rational
priority setting because there is no metric that can be
used to compare hazards with physically (clinically)
dissimilaroutcomes.
The risk sciences have been maturing rapidly in the development of metrics for comparing hazards with clinically dissimilar
outcomes. 8 The earliest metric used in the risk sciences was the
number of lives lost. Recognizing that everyone must die sooner
or later, risk scientists later developed the notion of years of life
lost (or what are sometimes called "expected life years" ("ELYs")
lost), where the death of a 30-year old might be assigned a loss of
40 life years while the death of a 65-year old might be assigned a
loss of only 20 years (based on life-table analysis). This hypothetical example leads to the interesting conclusion that the premature death of one anonymous 30-year old is equivalent in overall
loss (using ELYs as the metric of comparison) to the premature
death of two anonymous 65-year olds. Advocates for senior citizens might react particularly negatively to a modified version of
ELYs that counts only those life years lost prior to age 65 or 70,
presumably the "productive" life years, as defined by the Centers
for Disease Control.
A bigger, more recent advance has been the incorporation of
morbidity. outcomes and quality of life into "risk metrics" that
traditionally used only mortality information. The World Bank is
promoting the concept of "disability~adjusted life years" (DALYs)
for use in "burden of illness" studies that compare the impact of
various diseases. 7 The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services has suggested more widespread use of the concept of
"quality-adjusted life years" (QALYs) in cost-effectiveness analyses of programs and technologies.' While DALYs and QALYs
differ slightly in technical implementation, they share the attractive feature that they permit a comparison of, say, arthritis or
the common cold (which have only limited mortality consequences) with cancer and heart disease (which have relatively high
mortality rates).
Progress in the development of advanced risk metrics is
encouraging and thus the lack of a common metric for risk rank-

Robert M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating Quality-Adjusted Life Years,

in Frank A. Sloan, ed, Valuing Health Care 31 (Cambridge 1995).
" Christopher J.L. Murray and Alan D. Lopez, The Global Burden on Disease (Harvard 1996).
" Martha R. Gold, et al, Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Oxford 1996).
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ing is not a technically valid reason to discourage use of the risk
sciences in priority setting. Even if there are ethical disagreements about which risk metric is most defensible or technical
disagreements about how to define or weight different health
states,89 a sensitivity analysis can be performed to determine
whether the decision at hand is sensitive to the choice of risk
metric. If sensitivity is established, a risk regulator would be well
advised to pose the ethical issue to a citizen advisory committee
that is carefully informed about the nature of the disagreement
and the alternative viewpoints.
Objection 3: The risk sciences cannot produce rational
priority setting because there is no metric that can be
used to compare hazards with psychologically different
attributes.
The risk sciences envision a critical role for scientific understanding of public values in a rational priority-setting process.
Although the probabilistic component of risk analysis can sometimes be performed successfully without an appreciation of public
values, the proper valuation of outcomes in risk analysis requires
information on public values-at least in a democratic society
such as the United States. For example, the question whether
heart disease should be accorded higher priority in resource allocation than cancer requires consideration of not only actuarial
frequencies but also citizen value judgments about the relative
consequences of heart disease and cancer for quality of life.
There is, however, a conceptual distinction between the descriptive psychological factors that predict how upset or concerned people might be about a risk,9° and prescriptive factors
that are judged, after thoughtful public deliberation, to be appropriate for inclusion by policymakers in a rational priority setting
process.91 Some of America's earliest and most influential proponents of democracy noted that not all citizen sentiments are
worthy of influence in public decisionmaking, and legal scholars

M

See Ellen Silbergeld, The Risks of ComparingRisks, 3 NYU Envir L J 405 (1994).

'o

Baruch Fischhoff, Stephen R. Watson, and Chris Hope, Defining Risks, 17 Pol Sci

123 (1984); Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts versus Fears:

UnderstandingPerceived Risk, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds,
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 463 (Cambridge 1982).
" Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533 (1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U Chi Legal F 101; Ralph M. Perhac, Defining Risk:

Normative Considerations,2 Hum & Ecol Risk Assessment 381 (1996); Frank Cross, The
Public Role in Risk Control, 24 Envir Law 888 (1994).
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remain skeptical of decisionmaking processes that give uncritical
acceptance to popular will.92
Suppose, for example, that the risk of AIDS-large though it
may be in actuarial terms-were associated with minimal psychic
impact to most citizens because it afflicts primarily homosexual
men and intravenous drug users, groups that are unpopular
among the general citizenry. It is not necessarily appropriate to
"downgrade" AIDS as a public priority by incorporating this particular psychological reaction into risk analyses developed for
priority-setting purposes. Psychological reactions that have no
ethical justification (for example, racial prejudice) have no merit
in a risk analysis."
One can also question whether "familiarity"-an important
factor in risk-perception studies-should be relevant to governmental priority setting. People do react more negatively to unfamiliar killers than familiar ones, but that does not necessarily
justify diverting money from prevention of traffic crashes-a
familiar hazard-to regulation of biotechnology accidents-an
unfamiliar hazard. Indeed, psychologists have shown that familiarity breeds an optimism bias ("it won't happen to me") that
causes many familiar yet voluntary hazards to receive too little
concern by at-risk individuals." In a veil of ignorance where
citizens were asked to provide thoughtful principles for priority
setting, it is doubtful whether familiarity per se would be given
much weight.9 5
On the other hand, the degree of psychological trauma associated with some diseases (for example, breast cancer) is greater
than for others (for example, coronary artery disease), and it has
genuine appeal as an important psychological consideration in
priority setting. Thus, in a risk analysis of long-term estrogen
therapy for postmenopausal women, net life expectancy among
women under drug therapy increases because the estimated decline in heart disease has a larger longevity impact on women
than the estimated increase in breast cancer.9 6 Yet it may be

Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1557 (cited in note 91); Sunstein, 1997 U Chi Legal F
at 115-21 (cited in note 91).
' See Frank Cross, The Risk of Reliance on Perceived Risk, 3 Risk: Issues in Health
& Safety 60 (1992).
" See Neil D. Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen To Me: Perceptionsof Risk Factors
and Susceptibility, 3 Health Psych 431 (1984).
9
Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1557 (cited in note 91).
' John D. Graham and Jonathan B. Wiener, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting
Health and the Environment (Harvard 1995).
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appropriate to adjust this actuarial calculation (using QALYs, for
example) to reflect the relatively larger psychological burden of
breast cancer (assuming this feeling were validated in careful
interviews of women at risk for the two diseases and informed of
their consequences). The analytic tools of decision analysis, including multi-attribute utility theory, have been developed precisely for this purpose.9 7
Psychological factors that have descriptive significance may
also reflect errors in judgment or confused reasoning.9" For example, people may allow the benefits of a technology to distort
their assessments of the risk of the technology. Laypeople often
rate hazards lower on scales of "perceived riskiness" if they are associated with perceived benefits," a consideration that is irrelevant
to priority setting if the risk can be reduced or prevented without
losing the associated benefit. Medical x-rays and pharmaceuticals
are rated relatively low in perceived risk in part because they are
associated with therapeutic benefit, but the benefit may be obtainable with the introduction of less risky technologies or clinical practices. In prescriptive risk analyses, the risks and benefits
of alternative courses of action should be estimated separately
based on science rather than lumped together in an amorphous
notion such as "perceived risk."
A troubling though not uncommon dilemma is the situation
where elaborate regulatory programs are advocated on the basis
of public fears of risk, even though scientific information on probability and loss suggest that such fears are groundless or are
poorly supported."° In some cases it may be appropriate to respond to fears with an educational program rather than a regulatory program, or to simply "take the heat" by doing nothing about
the fears. If accountable politicians choose to override the conclusions of risk analyses and to demand regulatory responses to
groundless or unproven fears, that is an acceptable outcome in a

Diana B. Petitti, Meta-Analysis, Decision Analysis, and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis:
Methods for Quantitative Synthesis in Medicine (Oxford 1994); Ralph L. Keeney, Detlof
von Winterfeldt, and Thomas Eppel, ElicitingPublic Values for Complex Policy Decisions,
36 Mgmt Sci 1011 (1990); M.W. Merkhofer and Ralph L. Keeney, Multiattribute Utility
Analysis of Alternative Sites for the Disposalof Nuclear Waste, 7 Risk Analysis 173 (1987).
" See Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty (cited in

note 90).
Ali Siddiq Alhakami and Paul Slovic, A PsychologicalStudy of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085 (1994).

" Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, Phantom Risk:
Scientific Inference and the Law (MIT 1993); Aaron wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen's

Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues (Harvard 1995).

LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

democracy. But it is far from obvious that prescriptive risk analyses should be numerically adjusted to account for groundless or
speculative public fears. 1
From a psychological as well as ethical perspective, risks
that are imposed on individuals without their knowledge and
consent are more offensive to people than risks that individuals
choose to undertake with full information and mental compe.tence.0 2 In priority setting at regulatory agencies, should invol-untary (uncontrollable) risks "trump" voluntary (controllable)
ones? Here again, the immediate reaction of people may not al..
ways be mirrored in their opinion after reflection and discussion.
Suppose a dietary factor (voluntary) and an outdoor air pol..
lutant (involuntary) both cause the same degree of cancer risk.
Conventional wisdom holds that lower priority should be assigned to risks caused by the persons making private dietary
decisions, as long as they are informed and judged mentally competent to choose, but that it is urgent to counteract the polluter's
behavior on behalf of the person being victimized by the involuntary cancer risk.0 3 This argument has ethical appeal, but public health scientists have established that it may be feasible to
reduce or prevent the voluntary risk from diet-without intruding into the privacy or freedom of the person at risk!
A hypothetical solution is instructive. Suppose two pills are
invented: Pill A prevents the dietary risk (without changing eating habits) and Pill B prevents the pollutant risk (without changing emissions of pollution). Neither pill has side effects, and both
can be obtained and taken with minimal intrusion or privacy
invasion. Assume the same population is exposed to both hazards. While some people at risk may be willing to pay more money for Pill B than Pill A, the magnitude of the difference in willingness to pay would probably be modest-nowhere near the
1,000-fold differences in "acceptability" that have been suggested
in the descriptive literature on risk perception.'" The key factor
for regulators to weigh is not necessarily the degree of
voluntariness per se in the assumption of risk, but rather the

Cross, 24 Envir Law at 888 (cited in note 91).
Consumer's Union, FacingOur Fears:MeasuringRisk is a Tricky Business. But the
Public May Have Something to Teach the Experts, Consumer Rep 50 (Dec 1996).
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9 Risk Analysis 349 (1989).
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degree of intrusion into the lives of citizens at risk that is necessary to prevent or reduce the risk.
In this regard, it may indeed be appropriate to give smokingrelated risks somewhat less priority than pollution-related risks
(even though the smoking-related risks are larger in magnitude).
The reason may be in part that smoking is voluntary and, more
important, that it is difficult to devise effective interventions that
are not intrusive from the perspective of those smokers who genuinely enjoy their habit (beyond the addiction). The development
of a "enjoyable" yet "safe" cigarette might cause smoking to become a much higher priority of regulators since the safe cigarette
could be mandated or encouraged without imposing a major intrusion on the freedom of smokers. In contrast, pollution-prevention requirements may be intrusive to polluters-whether they be
corporations or individuals-but are not generally intrusive into
the lives of citizens who are exposed to the resulting risks
(though mandatory periodic emissions testing of cars has often
been rejected as intrusive by citizens who are both polluters and
victims of pollution).
Another superficially plausible idea is to give more weight to
hazards that kill bunches of people at a time ("clustered hazards") as opposed to an equivalent number of people who die one
at a time ("diffuse hazards"). This property of some hazards to
cause "disaster"-by clustering deaths in space and time-has
been found to predict perceived risk, and is supported by the
commonly held notion that airplane crashes generate more public
concern than an equivalent number of highway deaths. Yet those
who have thought rigorously and carefully about this subject
have not always concurred that clustering of deaths deserves
extra public priority. For example, giving extra weight to disasters appears to be incompatible (mathematically) with responding
to certain demands for "risk equity,"'0 5 demands that are also a
popular concept in the risk-perception literature. And one of the
earliest technical papers on this subject makes the interesting
point that the overall amount of pain and suffering among survivors is often larger for diffuse hazards than clustered hazards
because the people who care the most about a victim are more
likely to survive a diffuse hazard than a clustered one.'
In summary, it is perfectly appropriate for psychological
considerations to be given considerable weight in regulatory pri-

'o'
1

See Ralph Keeney, Equity and Public Risk, 29 Operations Res 527 (1980).
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Proceduresfor Valuing Lives, 23 Pub Pol 419 (1975).
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ority setting. Quantifiable weights can be applied to what lay
citizens see as important qualitative considerations. Yet it should
be recognized that a psychic reaction does not necessarily pass
the test of being appropriate for regulatory decisionmaking just
because it is salient to people and a source of concern. Social scientists have developed useful tools for sorting through these
psychological considerations. 7 The procedures for making such
determinations will usually look more like utility-elicitation sessions or focus groups than public hearings involving organized
stakeholders.' When public reactions differ sharply from the
prescriptions of risk analyses, even after careful citizen deliberation, politicians may feel compelled to override the prescriptions
of risk analyses, and they certainly have the power and right to
do so.
Objection 4: The risk sciences cannot produce rational
priority setting because there is no ethical basis for ranking risks (or risk-managementoptions) that affect different people.
The risk sciences are rooted in utilitarian ethics where the
social objective is to maximize some notion of the "the greatest
good for the greatest number." Other things being equal, hazards
that kill or harm more people are generally accorded higher priority than hazards that kill or harm fewer people, regardless of
who the people are. In medicine, for example, advocates of costeffectiveness analysis hold that QALYs gained (or lost) can and
should be aggregated across people for decisionmaking purposes,
regardless of the wealth or income of the population at risk."°
Some economists, however, define rational decisionmaking according to a willingness-to-pay metric that gives greater weight0
to the preferences of citizens with greater ability to pay."1
There are a small but growing number of welfare economists
interested in developing various equity adjustments to willingness-to-pay calculations aimed at protecting the interests of citizens with low ability to pay."'
1o7 See

Robin Gregory, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Paul Slovic, Valuing Environmental
Resources: A Constructive Approach, 177 J Risk & Uncertainty 177 (1993); Baruch
Fischhoff, Value Elicitation:Is There Anything There?, 46 Am Psychologist 835 (1991).
" National Research Council, UnderstandingRisk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (1996).
Martha R. Gold, et al, Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Oxford 1996).
110 George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, and Robert Fabian, eds, Valuing Health for Policy:
An Economic Approach (Chicago 1994).
...See John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, Willingness to Pay and the Distributionof
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As a practical matter, many comparative-risk projects address these sensitive issues of distributional ethics through informal group discussions involving diverse citizens rather than
through formal analysis.' Since the largest risks (measured by
objective indices) are often ones that are incurred
disproportionately by low-income and minority citizens, the challenge of achieving distributional equity in priority setting may
not always be much different from the challenge of achieving
efficiency in priority setting."' In any case, there is nothing
about the concept of "rational priority setting" that precludes
consideration of distributional ethics as long as the distributional
weights are defined rigorously and completely.
Imposing strong distributional constraints on each risk regulation is unwise because it paralyzes the process by giving veto
powers to the subgroups who happen to lose on each issue. The
long-term losses in public health and environmental protection
caused by "distributional paranoia" are potentially enormous and
would not be attractive to citizens who were designing society in
a "veil of ignorance.""" Consistent losers have a much stronger
equity claim, particularly if they are otherwise disadvantaged in
society, but these legitimate equity claims are better addressed
on a "lump-sum" basis rather than through blockage of each risk
regulation with unfavorable distributional consequences."'
Objection 5: The risk sciences cannot produce rational
priority setting because they provide no basis for deciding when to stop analyzing priorities and when to start
preventing or reducing risks.
From a risk-science perspective, deciding when to stop studying uncertain risks and start acting to prevent them is a classic
"value of information" ("VOI") problem."' A priority-setting di-

Risk and Wealth, 104 J Pol Econ 747 (1996); Magnus Johanesson, Theory and Methods of
Economic Evaluation of Health Care (Kiuwer 1996).
1'
Richard Minard, Kenneth Jones, and Christopher Patterson, State Comparative
Risk Projects:A Force for Change (Northeast Center for Comparative Risk 1993); Clarence
J. Davies, Comparing Environmental Risks: Tools for Setting Government Priorities
(Resources for the Future 1995).
"1'

John D. Graham and Elizabeth Richardson, Ranking Risk Inequities, 6 Risk:

Health, Safety, & Envir 359 (1995).

..
4 Pratt and Zeckhauser, 104 J Pol Econ at 747 (cited in note 111).
.. See Herman B. Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to
Risks: Its Philosophyand Legitimacy, in Dougals Maclean, ed, Values at Risk 31 (Rowman

& Allanheld 1986).
"6 Morgan and Henrion, Uncertainty (cited in note 77).
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lemma deserves further study only as long as the expected benefits from further study (defined as the additional risk reduction
expected to result from better informed rankings) are greater
than the expected risks from delay while study occurs (for example, the risks incurred during the period of study that otherwise
could be prevented or reduced by immediate action). The framework for VOI analysis is quite elegant and is supported by increasingly sophisticated and flexible computer software. Interestingly, the VOI framework draws insights from both the "precautionary principle" (often advocated by environmental activists)
and cost-benefit analysis (often advocated by business interests).
In recent years, VOI analysis has been applied to a variety of
real-world, risk-management problems in environmental
health.'17
VI. A MENU OF RISK-BASED REFORMS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION

This Part proposes a menu of legislative reforms that offer
promise as contributions to "rational priority-setting." None of
them are discussed in detail, since the objective of the section is
simply to provide a menu of possibilities as a stimulus for future
discussion and deliberation. These reforms could be adopted as
part of an integrated regulatory reform statute or they could be
incorporated into existing risk-protection statutes as they are
scheduled for reauthorization by Congress.
A. Sound-Science Requirements in Risk Determinations
When regulators make an official risk determination (for
example, use of product x is a "carcinogen" or is associated with a
specific elevation in the rate of birth defects), there are major
implications not only for subsequent regulatory response but also
for how the product is viewed in the marketplace and by juries in
tort liability suits. It is therefore important that the
government's risk-assessment determinations be based on sound
scientific principles and procedures.
Congress should require that any official risk determination
issued by a federal agency, regardless of whether or not it has
been used to justify a final regulatory action, be based on an
...Adam M. Finkel and John S. Evans, Evaluating the Benefits of Uncertainty Reduction in Environmental Health Risk Management, 37 J Air Pollution Control Assn 1164
(1987).
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objective, weight-of-the-evidence evaluation that is peer reviewed
by a group of independent scientists. The panel of peer reviewers
should be selected through a process that identifies qualified
experts. The office that prepared the risk assessment should not
control the selection of the reviewers. Any conflicts of interest
among panel members should be publicly disclosed, and no panel
should be dominated by members, knowledgeable though they
may be, who have a particular conflict of interest (for example, a
financial stake in the outcome). The historical experience of agencies with scientific peer review is that it generally enhances both
the scientific competence and credibility of agency
decisionmaking."
When official risk determinations include a numerical estimate of risk, a formal uncertainty analysis should accompany the
determination, including presentation of central estimates of risk
as well as plausible upper and lower bounds on the true yet unknown risk." 9 Where feasible, a probabilistic analysis should be
undertaken and reported."2 Language of this sort was included
in the recent amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act passed
by Congress.12 1

The proper extent of judicial review- of sound science questions is a topic of intense debate in the scientific and legal communities. Because reviewing courts are a poor forum for resolving
technical issues, the opportunity for judicial review of risk determinations should be limited. Yet adversely affected parties
should be entitled to make a case before a reviewing court that
the agency handled the sound-science requirements in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. The courts should defer to the scientific judgments of the agency as long as proper procedures were
followed and the determinations, disputable though they may be,
fall within a zone of reasonable scientific interpretation.
Sound-science requirements should have the effect of discouraging agencies from devoting scarce agency resources to risks
118 Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Harvard
1990); John D. Graham, Harnessing Science for EnvironmentalRegulation (Praeger 1991).
"' John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Robert W.
Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved Getting Better Results from Regulation 183

(Oxford 1996); Nandan Kenkeremath, Restoring Reason to Regulation: Applying Scientific
Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis to Environmental Law, 57 Am Indus Hygiene Assn
J 791 (1996).
120

National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (National

Academy 1995).

"1'Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub L No 104-182, 110 Stat 1613,
1621-23, codified at 42 USC § 300g-1(bX1) (1994 & Supp 1996).
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that are not well supported by science. These same resources
would then be available for investment in efforts to prevent risks
that are supported by sound science.
Some writers have sought to defend the use of plausibly
"conservative" risk estimates--those that are more likely to over-.
estimate than underestimate the true (yet unknown) risk--on the
grounds that decisionmakers should be "better safe than sorry"
when protecting public health and the environment.1" Sound-.
science requirements do not undercut or endorse this approach to
decisionmaking. They instead insist that decisionmakers be presented with the full range of plausible risk estimates (and their
relative likelihood), so that decisionmakers can make an informed judgment about how conservative to be in the face of
uncertainty. If only one plausibly "conservative" estimate of risk
is presented, decisionmakers will not know how conservative this
number is, how it should be compared with the uncertain costs of
various interventions, or how it should be compared to uncertain
risks that precautionary action may induce. 1" Even those
decisionmakers who are "risk averse" and place a high value on
protection should not necessarily support reliance on conservative
risk estimates, since exclusive reliance on these estimates will
distort
priority-setting and the balancing of costs and bene124
fits.

B. High-Priority Risk Tests
One approach Congress could take would be to write legislation that requires regulators to give special (that is, accelerated)
attention to risks that satisfy some test of high priority. For
example, Congress has already required that any risks that pose
an "imminent" threat to worker health and safety be addressed
through special procedures (for example, emergency temporary
standards) under the Occupational Safety and Health Act."m In
the Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress established a priority-setting trigger for substances that may be associated with a
significant risk of serious or widespread harm in the form of

122 Adam M. Finkel, Toward Less Misleading Comparisons of Uncertain Risks: The
Example of Aflatoxin and Aar, 103 Envir Health Persp 376 (1995).
"2 John D. Graham and Jonathan B. Wiener, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting

Health and the Environment (Harvard 1995).
" See Ralph M. Perhac, Does Risk Aversion Make a Case for Conservatism?, 7 Risk:
Health, Safety, & Envir 297 (1996).
'25 29 USC § 655 (1994)
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cancer or birth defects. 2 ' Substances that satisfy this prioritysetting test are subject to accelerated determinations about
whether risks
are unreasonable and whether regulatory action is
12 7
required.
It might be useful for Congress to devise a uniform set of
criteria, based on the risk sciences, that would govern prioritysetting activities at risk-protection agencies. These criteria
should certainly include, at a minimum, the degree of certainty
that a risk exists, the probability of an adverse outcome, the
number of people (or ecosystems) at risk, the nature and severity
of the adverse outcome, the degree of unfairness and inequity
associated with the risk, and the availability of actions that could
reduce or prevent the risk in a cost-effective fashion.
Statutory structures regarding high-priority risks contribute
to rational priority-setting by inducing expenditure of scarce
agency resources on the most important risks and risk-reduction
measures. These kinds of provisions can be strengthened by petitioning procedures that allow outside parties to propose risks for
high-priority designation, including the opportunity for judicial
appeal if the agency responds to a petition in an arbitrary and
capricious fashion. Petitions that are certified for technical competence by qualified third parties might justify priority attention.
A critical feature of any "high priority" claim should be a comparative analysis of the target risk and other selected risks within
the agency's jurisdiction (for example, those that have already
been regulated and those that have not been regulated).
C. Low-Priority Risk Tests
Congress can also write legislation that authorizes or compels an agency to ignore risks that are of low priority as determined by risk assessments."2 In the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act, Congress used a variant of this approach in the
regulation of residual risks from toxic air pollution (that is, the
pollution remaining after implementation of maximum achievable
control technology)."2 Here, Congress specified a numerical level of lifetime cancer risk from an industrial source, one chance in

§ 2603(f) (1994).
Id.
"2 See March Sadowitz and John D. Graham, A Survey of Permitted Residual Cancer
Risks, 6 Risk: Health, Safety, & Envir 17 (1995).
28 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, 2543-44,
codified at 42 USC § 7412(f)(2) (1994).
126 15 USC
127
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a million for the most exposed person, that was judged to be
sufficiently small that further emission reductions would not be required of the source under the 1990 Amendments.13 Serious;
questions have been raised about whether Congress understood
this mandated level of negligible risk,'3 1 but it is a crude case of
legislative priority setting based on the risk sciences. In the recent Food Quality Protection Act, which governs regulation of
pesticide residues on foods, Congress chose a narrative standard
of "reasonable certainty of no harm" as opposed to specification of
a numerical level of negligible risk."2 These kinds of provisions
are intended to spare the regulator and regulated parties the
burden of expending scarce resources on tiny risks.
The resource-saving property of these provisions could be
strengthened by the use of qualified third parties as a mechanism to verify "low-priority" risk claims submitted by petitioners,
thereby preventing agency resources from being devoted to the
review of numerous claims of low-priority risk. These parties
could be paid for their analytical work by regulatees as accounting firms are now paid by corporations." The integrity of the
third-party review would be enhanced by competition among
certification organizations for reputation as objective reviewers,
including designation of those third parties that have been
judged by the regulatory agency to have a track record of performing objective, high-quality assessments/reviews.
D. Authorization of Alternative Risk-Reduction Programs
Congress could pass a unified statute authorizing regulatees
to propose alternative risk-reduction ("ARR") plans that would
serve as substitutes for compliance with existing requirements
under current law. For example, an industrial facility or product
manufacturer might be authorized to implement, subject to agency approval, an ARR plan if it can be demonstrated, based on the
risk sciences, that the alternative plan would reduce risk to a
greater extent than would compliance with existing regulatory
requirements. This idea differs from the concept of "alternative

130 Id.

Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray, and John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 Ecol L Q 269 (1992).

"' Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489, 1514-35,
codified at 21 USC § 346a (1994 & Supp 1996).
" Peter J. Neumann, Darren E. Zinner, and David A. Palatiel, The FDA and Regulation of Cost-effectiveness Claims, 15 Health Aff 54 (1996).
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compliance" in that the ultimate objective of ARR is less risk as
well as less compliance cost.
A narrow version of this concept would restrict allowable
ARR plans to the same pollutants, disease endpoints, and/or
target populations that would be affected by compliance activities
under current law. For example, an oil refinery might propose to
reduce emissions of benzene by controlling various fugitive emissions with leak-detection and maintenance programs rather than
by implementing a specific technology mandated by EPA regulation. Or the oil refinery might choose to purchase and discard
older cars in a community near a refinery, with analyses demonstrating that the number of old cars removed from the fleet will
reduce benzene emissions to a greater extent than will compliance with the mix of benzene emission standards promulgated
under current laws.
A more flexible version of ARR would authorize an agency to
permit any form of risk reduction to serve as a substitute plan
for mandatory requirements in current law, as long as the proposed plan achieves more overall risk reduction (regardless of
what causes the risk, the particular disease endpoint, or the particular target population) than would compliance with existing
requirements. For example, an oil refinery might propose to fund
promising AIDS-prevention and violence-prevention programs for
a 10-year period (or the projected remaining life of the refinery)
in a community where the refinery is located in exchange for
reducing benzene emissions by only 60 percent instead of the
mandated 90 percent. Using the risk sciences, the refinery would
make a case that the incremental risk associated with the incremental emission authorization is less important than the risk
reduced by the AIDS-prevention and violence-prevention programs. Such proposals might be particularly persuasive when
they are certified for technical competence by qualified third
parties and endorsed by a panel of lay citizens appointed by community leaders."3
The advantage of ARR is that it shifts control of priority
setting from a command-and-control regulator with limited resources and information to numerous decentralized yet competitive actors with incentives to find cheaper yet more effective
ways to reduce risk."'8 Particularly exciting is the prospect of

" John Graham and March Sadowitz, Reforming Superfund: Reducing Risk through
Community Choice, Issues in Sci & Tech 35 (Summer 1994).
" Amoco and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Amoco/U.S. EPA Pollution
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doing more for the health of a community by implementing the
most cost-effective approaches to community health improve.ment. If ecological impacts are of particular concern to the com..
munity, it may also be appropriate for the ARR plan to include
programs of habitat protection and land conservation that do
more good for ecology than the incremental reductions in chemi.,
cal emissions.""
E. Requirements to Identify and Weigh Risk Tradeoffs
Well-intentioned efforts to reduce a target risk may (perhaps
inadvertently) increase other risks ("substitution" or "countervailing" risks). For example, requiring auto manufacturers to make
cars more fuel efficient may induce manufacturers to make lighter, and thus, less safe cars." 7 It has been well documented that
these countervailing risks tend to be neglected or downplayed in
the current decisionmaking processes at federal agencies."
Recognizing the reality of risk tradeoffs, Congress should
require that a "more good than harm" approach be applied to
new regulatory programs.'39 Under this approach, some
countervailing risks would be tolerable as long as the agency
made a reasoned case that reductions in the target risk or risks
would produce more good than the harm created by the countervailing risks. By compelling consideration of countervailing risks,
Congress might induce regulators to be more creative in devising
proposals that can reduce the target risks without creating any
countervailing risks (or even reducing countervailing risks). At a
minimum, Congress can rectify the current bias against concern
about countervailing risks by requiring regulators to identify any
countervailing risks associated with their actions and to explain
how they have weighed these countervailing risks in regulatory
determinations. More aggressively, Congress might amend the
Administrative Procedure Act"4 to say that "agencies shall ensure, to the extent feasible, that regulations do not create countervailing risks that are greater than the regulated risk.""

PreventionProject (1992).
"' Graham and Sadowitz, Issues in Sci & Tech at 35 (cited in note 134).

137 See John D. Graham, The Safety Risks of Fuel Economy Legislation, 3 Risk:
Health, Safety, & Envir 85 (1992).
"

Graham and Wiener, Risk versus Risk (cited in note 123).

1' Edward W. Warren and Gary E. Marchant, More Good Than Harm:A Hippocratic
Oath for EnvironmentalAgencies and Courts, 20 Ecol L Q 379 (1993).
5 USC § 551 et seq (1994).
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
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Courts should view an agency's behavior as "arbitrary and
capricious" if the regulator ignores a serious countervailing risk
that has been documented in the rulemaking record. Courts
should not second-guess how the agency has weighed the countervailing risks as long as the agency has proceeded in a reasoned way. Some court decisions have already shown sympathy
with this viewpoint under current laws.
Congress would promote more uniform consideration of countervailing risks if it
would give them statutory significance in a general provision
covering all risk-protection agencies.
When reauthorizing environmental statutes, Congress should
empower the EPA to investigate risk tradeoffs and design integrated programs that take into account a variety of target risks
as well as countervailing risks. The EPA's idea of a "cluster
rulemaking," where an entire industry's air, water, and waste
disposal problems are regulated in a coordinated fashion, may be
more rational than separate regulatory determinations about air,
water, and waste disposal under various statutes.
When regulatory decisions have significant consequences in a
contest of competing technologies, Congress should authorize the
performance of synoptic analyses to identify the issues and,
where possible, the preferred, risk-minimizing strategies. Fragmented regulatory programs aimed at waste disposal, for example, may inadvertently be producing risk-inferior outcomes. In
particular, some analysts believe that the mix of current regulatory programs is producing too many landfills and too few incinerators compared with what would occur under a rational priority-setting regime." The Congressional Budget Office should be
commissioned to prepare targeted studies for Congress on technological choices where important risk tradeoffs must be made.
Congress should consider the results of these studies when it
drafts legislation governing specific technological choices. Because these comparisons will often be complex, it probably makes
sense for expert administrative agencies to make explicit choices
among technologies under a broad mandate from Congress to do
"more good than harm." Even better, agencies should devise innovative regulatory approaches that allow market choices of tech-

Stan L Rev 247 (1996).
" Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991); Competitive Enterprise Institute v NHTSA, 45 F3d 481 (DC Cir 1995).
" Graham and Wiener, Risk versus Risk (cited in note 123).
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nologies to be made with more careful consideration of risk tradeoffs.
F. Requirements that Benefits Justify Costs
Cost-benefit analysis of important legislative and administrative actions is already required by a Presidential Executive
Order'" and by the recent legislation curtailing "unfunded mandates." 45 What is missing is appropriate criteria governing how
cost-benefit considerations should influence the decisions of risk
regulators.
At the present time, it would not be advisable for Congress
to mandate strict decisional criteria that compel the benefits of a
proposal to exceed its costs, a point that has been emphasized by
organized environmentalists.'" Although recent technical progress has been achieved in cost-benefit analysis, 47 there are
some important categories of benefit and cost that cannot yet be
quantified and monetized with current tools (for example, ecological consequences and impacts on privacy and personal freedom).
A more realistic decision criteria would compel regulators to explain how benefits of a rule "justify" costs, taking into account
the fact that only some of the benefits and costs will be
quantifiable.'"
A uniform "benefits must justify costs" test should replace
the numerous (and sometimes conflicting) decisional criteria that
appear in the current statutes governing the behavior of risk
regulators." 9 The fiction of risk-only and health-only decisions
should be replaced by the rational precept that all health, safety,
and environmental decisions entail a balancing of risks, costs,
and benefits.5 " The recent controversy about EPA's proposals to
tighten the national ambient air quality standards for particles
and ozone illustrates the need to bring cost considerations more
explicitly into EPA's decisionmaking process.' 5 '
'"

Executive Order No 12,866, 3 CFR 638 (1993).
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48.

'
National Wildlife Federation, Johnston-RobbRegulatory Reform Bill: PublicHealth
ProtectionsAn EndangeredSpecies (1995).
...W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk
(Oxford 1992); George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, and Robert Fabian, eds, Valuing Health for
Policy: An Economic Approach (Chicago 1994).
' Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation:Achieving
More Protection at Less Cost, 1 Hum & Ecol Risk Assessment 183 (1995).
149 Kenneth J. Arrow, Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 21 (1996).
'5 John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233 (1990).
,' John H. Cushman, Surprise Senate Challenge to Pollution Plan: Costs are Ques-
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Cost-benefit analyses require peer review and sound-science
principles for the same reasons that risk assessments require
peer review. Some of this peer review can be exercised by OMB
late in the rulemaking process but at this late stage it is difficult
for a risk regulator to retreat from (or modify) a rulemaking
proposal. Congress should require agencies to subject regulatory
impact analyses to peer review prior to submission to OMB in
order to make sure that cost and benefit information is being
handled competently and that creative regulatory options that
promise more risk protection at less cost are not missed by the
agency.
G. VOI Approach to Additional Studies
One of the understandable fears of pro-regulation activists is
that new analytical requirements and decisional criteria will be
exploited by regulatees as a tactic to create a "paralysis of analysis" in agency decisionmaking.15 2 This raises the problem of determining of the appropriate amount of information-gathering
and analysis to support a regulatory action.
On the one hand, a simple requirement that agencies adopt
"the precautionary principle" is not very helpful because the
number of risks that might seem to justify precautionary action
may far exceed the resources available to agencies.' Moreover,
establishing a role for precautionary action does not provide any
guidance about how stringent the resulting regulatory action
should be. Yet a strict net-benefit test for regulatory initiatives
aimed at uncertain risks is also unhelpful because the benefits
and costs (even if they can all be quantified and monetized) may
have wide bands of uncertainty that lead to ambiguous analytical
results. For example, an agency's benefit-cost analysis of a proposed regulation might find that net benefits are anywhere from
-$450 million per year to $530 million per year.
Congress should stipulate that a decision to undertake further studies in lieu of regulatory action should be based on a VOI
framework. This means that the costs of delay and further study

tioned by Environmentalists,NY Times As (Dec 7, 1996).

152 Adam M. Finkel and Dominic Golding, eds, Worst Things First? The Debate Over
Risk-Based National Environmental Priorities(Resources for the Future 1994); National
Wildlife Federation, Johnston-Robb Regulatory Reform Bill (cited in note 146); Franklin

E. Mirer, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and the OSHA StandardsProcess, Testimony before the National Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (1995).
" Frank Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 53 -Wash & Lee L
Rev 851 (1996).
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(including the additional risks incurred due to the absence of
immediate action) must be weighed against the likely benefits of
further study, measured by the projected reductions in risks and
costs that can be achieved due to a better understanding of the
consequences of competing regulatory alternatives. Even if the
VOI framework cannot be implemented formally with full
quantification, Congress should require agencies to justify decisions about further studies in a qualitative analysis based on the
principles of VOL.
Although VOI will not necessarily be a cure for delay in
regulatory decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that analytical requirements are rarely an exclusive or primary cause of
serious delay. Regulators who want to make timely decisions can
establish budgets and deadlines for analysts that achieve timely
decisions. The decision to accelerate the phase-out of lead in
gasoline was made in the Reagan Administration based on a
solid analysis that took perhaps two full-time equivalent staff a
period of about six months.1 By contrast, the risk assessments
of air toxics at EPA took years to complete under the Reagan Administration. " ' The root cause of delays is a lack of courage or
interest on the part of regulators, a problem that should be addressed through the appointments, confirmations, and oversight
processes, rather than through arbitrary restrictions on the quality and quantity of analyses performed by agency scientists.
H. A Periodic Regulatory Budget and Program
In order to make priority-setting a more explicit part of the
regulatory process, Congress should require the President, every
two or four years, to propose to Congress a total budget for the
costs induced by risk-regulation activities, including sub-budgets
for particular agencies and programs."' Unlike the normal budgetary process, which counts only costs that accrue to the federal
government, the regulatory budget would also include costs to
state and local governments and the private sector. Accompanying the budget should be a list of specific risks that will be addressed by regulatory action under the stated budget, including
an analysis justifying why this particular list of actions is an

John D. Graham and J.K. Hartwell, The Greening of Industry (Harvard 1997).
Id.
Robert E. Litan and William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (Yale
1983); John F. Morrall, Controlling Regulatory Costs: The Use of Regulatory Budgeting
(OECD 1992).
l5
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appropriate use of the total amount of resources specified in the
regulatory budget.
The President might choose (or be required by Congress to
develop) the regulatory program (total budget and specific list of
activities) through the appointment of a commission with expertise in the risk sciences and advisory panels from the affected
risk-protection agencies and stakeholder groups. The
commission's recommendations could be seen as purely advisory
or could be given procedural teeth along the lines required by the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 199057 or the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act" on deficit reduction.
Development of a regulatory budget requires two critical
kinds of decisions: specification of the total permissible size of
regulation-induced expenditures (in theory to be based on the
level of overall benefits to be achieved) and allocation of the "cap"
to specific agencies and programs (again presumably allocated on
the basis of relative benefit). Although a regulatory budget is
often advocated primarily on grounds of total cost control, there
may also be significant risk-reduction advantages associated with
a regulatory budget. For example, development of the budget
might induce healthy competition among agencies and programs
in pursuit of effective risk-reduction ideas. To some extent, such
competition is already induced in the budgetary process governing taxpayer dollars, but the regulatory budget would also induce
competition for off-budget resource expenditures that are attributable to risk regulation. Congress recently took a modest step
toward a regulatory budget by passing legislation that requires
that the total costs and benefits of regulation be estimated by
15 9
OMB and reported to Congress.
I. Shifting the Burden of Risk Analysis to the Private Sector
One should not assume that the government must always
incur the burden of risk analysis as a necessary condition of
regulatory action. An alternative approach is to presume that
private activities are unsafe unless private interests can demonstrate, through a risk-analytic process, that contemplated activities, such as industrial production or product sales, have levels of
risk that are acceptable. In this "gatekeeper" role, the burden of

"'

Pub L No 101-510, 104 Stat 1808.

Pub L No 99-177, 99 Stat 1038 (1985).
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-121,
110 Stat 847, 868-74, codified at 5 USC § 551 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996).
'
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risk analysis is shifted from government to the private sector.
Versions of this model are already being implemented under the
federal pesticide laws,"6 the Toxic Substances Control Act,"'
and California's Proposition 65 governing exposure to chemicals
that may cause cancer or birth defects. 62 As increasing fiscal
pressures prevent expansion of the staffs of regulatory agencies,
Congress should consider the promise of regulatory approaches
that shift the analytical burdens of making risk determinations
to the private sector.

VII. AN INTEGRATED STATUTE FOR SETTING RISK-BASED
PRIORITIES
Currently, the responsibility for setting priorities on risk is
scattered among numerous federal agencies operating under a
variety of statutory mandates. Congress passed the key enabling
laws beginning in the 1960s and 1970s and has amended them
intermittently since then." Yet the overall priorities of federal
risk-protection agencies have never been systematically reviewed
and Congress has never passed any legislation that deals comprehensively with risk.
It should therefore not .be surprising that there is no organized process for setting risk-based priorities in the federal government. Technical practices vary widely, high-quality science
plays a stronger role in some agencies and programs than in
others, the use of external peer review to promote science-based
priorities is spotty, the value judgments inherent in priority setting are rarely subjected to careful public scrutiny, the amount of
learning across agencies and programs is limited, and the overall
credibility of the federal government's risk assessment processes
is suspect.'" There is no unit in the federal government that
has overall responsibility for promoting a rational approach to
priority setting, which means that stakeholders with particular
interests can focus their priority-setting influences on public

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentcide Act, 7 USC § 136a(2) (1994).
161 15 USC § 2603 (1994).
12

Cal Health & Safety Code § 25249.5 (West 1992).

"

See note 6.

Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation:Achieving
More Protection at Less Cost, 1 Hum & Ecological Risk Assessment 183 (1995); National
Academy of Public Administration, Setting Priorities,Getting Results: A New Directionfor
EPA (1995); Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decisionmaking (1993).
'

54

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1997:

officials in Congress or specific agencies who lack a synoptic
perspective about risk.
The most important step Congress can take to promote rational priority setting is to authorize the Executive Office of the
President to lead, integrate, and oversee the assessment and
ranking of health, safety, and environmental risks throughout
the federal government.' This centralized leadership function
would entail expanded responsibilities for both the Science Advisor to the President and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
The Science Advisor to the President should be authorized by
Congress to establish a new Risk Analysis Council in the Office
of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") with multidisciplinary
expertise in the risk sciences. The responsibilities of the new
Council would be to (1) develop generic guidance on risk assessment practice (with periodic updating) that can be used by analysts and managers in federal agencies and the private sector; (2)
review the important risk assessment determinations made by
federal agencies to assure compliance with the guidance issued
by the Council; (3) advocate greater priority for the risk sciences
among public and private sector organizations that fund research
and development activities in risk-related areas; (4) collaborate
with universities and other educational organizations in the
development and evaluation of training activities in the risk
sciences; (5) promote the career development of risk analysts in
the federal government by facilitating experiences in different
agencies, sponsoring opportunities for exchanges with universities, and honoring career public servants who have made exemplary contributions to the risk sciences; and (6) promote, with
assistance from the State Department, the proper use of risk
sciences by international organizations and treaties dedicated to
protecting human health, safety, and the environment.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget should
be authorized by Congress to promote risk-based priority-setting
in both the budgetary process and the regulatory review process.
In order to fulfill this expanded role, OMB will require greater
and more diverse expertise in the risk sciences than it has today.
In budgeting, OMB should require risk-protection agencies to
engage periodically in risk-ranking exercises (including comparative cost-effectiveness studies) designed to promote rational priorHarvard Group on Risk Management Reform, 1 Hum & Ecological Risk Assessment 183 (cited in note 164).
16
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ity setting within each agency's jurisdiction. OMB should use
risk-based information in responding to budgetary requests from
specific agencies and programs. When statutory mandates preclude an agency from making a rational allocation of resources,
OMB and the agencies should be required to report to Congress
the specific statutory provisions that preclude rational priority
setting.
In the regulatory review process, OMB should, in collaboration with OSTP, scrutinize rulemaking proposals and make sure
that sound risk assessment practices are being employed by
agencies. Special attention should be given to the proper use of'
analytic tools that have been underutilized or poorly utilized in
the past, including quantitative uncertainty and variability analysis, risk-tradeoff analysis, and value-of-information analysis.
The scrutiny applied to estimates of costs should generally be
comparable in scope and intensity to the scrutiny applied to estimates of risks (or risk-reduction benefits). OMB should also promote and evaluate agency use of alternative risk-reduction plans
in order to advance rational priority setting.
In order to promote rational priority setting across federal
agencies, OSTP and OMB should collaborate with federal agencies in a three-year experiment aimed at ranking both risks and
risk-reduction opportunities throughout the federal government.
The experiment should build on the experiences with comparative-risk projects that have been undertaken at the EPAM and
in several dozen states.167 Particular care should be devoted to
handling the scientific uncertainties and the value judgments in
an explicit, quantitative fashion that draws on the insights of
interested laypeople as well as scientists.1" The purpose of the
experiment is to advance the state of the art in risk ranking by
demonstrating how diverse risks can be compared, how ordinary
citizens as well as scientists can make productive contributions,
and how future guidance to agencies on risk ranking should be
fashioned. Although stakeholders with vested interests (for example, business and environmental activist groups) should have
participatory roles in the experiment, a strong effort should be
made to give considerable weight to the participation of scientists
16

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and

Strategies for Environmental Protection (EPA 1990); U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Unfinished Business: A ComparativeRisk Assessment (EPA 1987).
167 Richard Minard, Kenneth Jones, and Christopher Patterson, State Comparative
Risk Projects;A Force for Change (Northeast Center for Comparative Risk 1993).
6

Baruch Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 Health, Safety, & Envir 191 (1995).
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and ordinary citizens. Based on the experiment, OSTP should
report to Congress about how risk ranking can be made a more
useful and widely used tool for promoting rational priority-set9
ting.'6
The new leadership responsibilities assigned to OSTP and
OMB should not be subject to extensive judicial review. The primary vehicle for monitoring the new OSTP/OMB responsibilities
should be the congressional oversight and appropriations processes.
CONCLUSION

Broad-based regulatory reform legislation was proposed by
the 104th Congress, but failed to pass.17 Some skeptics might
conclude that Congress has little genuine interest in using the
risk sciences to create a more rational process for establishing
regulatory priorities. There may indeed be political feasibility
problems with a pure "risk sciences" approach to regulatory reform, but it would be premature to draw such an inference based
on what happened in the 104th Congress.'7 1
First, it is important to recognize that while broad-based
reform failed to pass in the 104th Congress, Congress did embrace important components of the risk-sciences agenda... in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,173 the amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 74 the Food Quality Protection Act governing pesticide regulation,'7 5 and the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act. 76 In each of these

16 Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
Stan L Rev 247 (1996).
70 Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995, HR 1022, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb

23, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H 2261 (Feb 27, 1996); Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 291,
104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 27, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 1711 (Jan 27, 1995); Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2, 1995), in 141
Cong Rec S 9261 (June 28, 1995); Regulatory Procedures Reform Act of 1995, S 1001,
104th Cong, 1st Seas (June 19, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 9481 (June 30, 1995).
171 John D. Graham, The New Congress:A Strong Finish on Regulatory Reform, Risk
Pol Rep 31 (Aug 23, 1996).

"1 See generally, Thomas J. Bliley, The Republican 104th Congress: ProtectingHealth
and the Environment for Ourselves and Our Children (1996).
173 Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48.
'7' Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub L No 104-182, 110 Stat 1613,
1621-23, codified at 42 USC § 300g-1(b)(1) (1994 & Supp 1996).
,,5 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489, 1514-35,
codified at 21 USC § 346a (1994 & Supp 1996).
176 Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-304, 110

Stat 3798, codified at 49 USC § 60126-28 (1994 & Supp 1996).
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cases, strong bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate supported greater roles for the risk sciences in future information
generation and regulatory decisionmaking. Based on what happened in the 104th Congress, it seems likely that future
reauthorizations of laws dealing with risk regulation will contain
provisions that promote the risk sciences.
Second, comprehensive regulatory reform legislation based
on the risk sciences did receive substantial support in the 104th
Congress and was moderately close to being sent to President
Clinton's desk for signature.177 An ambitious bill (HR 1022) was
passed in February 1995 with a strong bipartisan majority in the
House (286-141),1"8 while a weaker bill sponsored by Senator
Dole (S 343) fell two votes short of the 60 votes necessary to stop
a filibuster in the Senate.179 The highly partisan vote in the
.Senate in July 1995 (54 out of 54 Republicans supporting cloture
but only 4 of 46 Democrats favoring cloture) may reflect early
presidential politics as much as it reflects determined opposition
to risk sciences among leading Democrats. In fact, the Clinton
Administration had to actively restrain several key Democrats
from working with Republicans to pass a strong bipartisan regulatory reform bill. The Democratic leadership made a calculation
that it was more profitable to accuse Republicans of rolling back
protections (in the guise of reform) than it was to work
collaboratively toward passage of a bipartisan regulatory reform
measure. A variety of leaders participated in the accusations
against Republican leaders, thereby lending a degree of credence
to the partisan charges made by Democrats."8
Third, the influential opponents of regulatory reform, both
the Clinton Administration and leading Senate Democrats, did
not contest the need for reform or the insights that could be provided by the risk sciences. They instead argued that the Republicans sought "rollback" rather than reform and that the major
Republican-drafted bills would not achieve genuine reform because they were too legalistic and would overwhelm agencies
with paperwork and litigation. This charge was particularly salient because many Republicans were simultaneously supporting
substantial cutbacks in the budgets of risk-protection agencies,

'"
Nandan Kenkeremath, Legislative Efforts Concerning Risk Assessment and CostBenefit Analysis for New Regulations, 48 Admin L Rev 321 (1996). See note 170.
37 Cong Rec H 2372 (Feb 28, 1995)

118 Cong Rec S 10399 (July 20, 1995).
Robert M. Entman, Reporting Environmental Policy Debate: The Real Media
Biases, 1 Press/Pol 77 (1996).
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cutbacks that certainly would have made it difficult to comply
with a variety of the informational requirements necessary to
support major new rulemakings. In the future, a more modest yet
comprehensive bill that promotes the risk sciences but creates
fewer litigation opportunities for regulatees may prove very attractive to a wide range of Democrats.
Despite the problems encountered in the 104th Congress,
there is no reason to be convinced that a future Congress and
President would reject regulatory reform legislation based on the
risk sciences. They will certainly reject any measure perceived to
be a "rollback" of protections under the guise of reform, but they
are likely to support a measure if they believe that it can deliver
more overall protection against risk at less cost to the public
than the current regulatory system.
Whether regulatory reform legislation actually passes in the
near future will depend upon numerous factors: who the authors
of the legislation are, how bipartisan the effort is, how the media
portrays the effort, how fervently organized environmental, labor,
and consumer activists contest this legislation, and how much
priority the regulated community gives to passing such legislation. With so many variables influencing the political feasibility
of risk-based reforms, only a risk analyst with an infallible crystal ball knows for sure what will happen. Even if comprehensive
reform legislation does not pass, the growing momentum behind
lasting risk-based reforms of individual statutes is apparent.

